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 1 Introduction
In centrally planned economies, such as China prior to 1978, most prices were
set by the government alongside quantity targets. When the need for reform was
accepted, there arose the question of how to move the economy from planning
towards a market-oriented system. In China, reformers chose to keep the existing
planned economy, but gradually to build up a free market system alongside it. This
was the essence of the Dual Track idea, which was initiated by reform of the price
system, through Dual Track Pricing (DTP). This gradualist approach to economic
reform, which was partly due to the unwillingness of China’s political leaders at
t h et i m et ot a k eb i gr i s k s ,w a st ob er o l l e do u tg r a d u a l l ya c r o s sr e g i o n sa n do v e ra
long period, with time for trial and error. Beginning with the agricultural sector,
DTP became a central part of economic reform in the 1980s, soon being applied to
the industrial sector, and in the 1990s it was extended to across the economy and
is still operative, for example, for foreign currency exchange rates and housing.1
Among the ﬁrst analyses of DTP in the Western literature are those of Byrd
(1987) and Sicular (1988), who examine the economic background from which
the two-tier system was born and how the two mechanisms of resource allocation
1The government still subsidizes the cost of accommodation for the employees of state-owned
ﬁrms. In the extended family the young generation may be buying housing at the market price,
but their parents may be employed by state-owned ﬁrms and enjoy the ‘plan track’ subsidy. An
intergenerational household may thus be buying housing at both plan-track and market prices.
1coexisted in China.2 A stylized model of the Chinese economy, with DTP applied
to agricultural products, is formulated by Bennett and Dixon (1996). In their
model, if the government holds down the dual-track price, i.e., if it restricts the
price at which coupons can be used to buy the plan-track quantity of agricultural
goods, general economic performance is harmed. The income eﬀect of the lower
coupon price results in an increase in nominal demand by households, causing
the market price of food to rise. The money wage therefore adjusts upward in
free market industries, so that both the quantity of exports and output across the
economy fall. Lau et al. (1997, 2000) examine the eﬀects of shifting from central
planning to DTP, in the ﬁrst of these papers at the general equilibrium level and
in the second in greater detail for a single good. They show that the introduction
of a market track, alongside a plan track in which prices and quantities are ﬁxed,
y i e l d saP a r e t og a i n . 3 Liu and Song (2003) consider the properties of the household
demand function under DTP and make a comparison with the standard household
demand model. They then aggregate demand functions for a good and focus on
how market price elasticity with DTP diﬀers from that in a free market, but they
do not consider the eﬀect of variation of dual track parameters on this market
price.
2On the dual track programme overall (not just prices) in the Chinese industrial sector, see
Wu and Zhao (1987).
3A recent paper by Che and Facchini (2007) shows that when the plan-track is not fully
enforced introduction of DTP may be detrimental to some agents.
2T h e r ei sa l s oal i t e r a t u r ee v a luating empirically the eﬀects of DTP. Gao et
al. (1996) apply Chinese urban food demand data to a DTP model and show
that government subsidization of food for urban households led to an increase
in market demand, so that the market prices of staple foods were pushed up.
Similarly, Liew (1993) ﬁnds that government price controls on industrial products
increased costs of production, so that removal of these controls would have reduced
production cost and increased real national income, as well as diminishing the scope
for corruption. Li, et al. (2000) develop a micro-model of the partial privatization
of Chinese industries, and show that the decentralization of government control
was an essential factor in the rapid growth of private industry in China.
T h ea n a l y s i st h a tw eu n d e r t a k ei sc o m p l e m e n t a r yt ot h a to fL a ue ta l . ,o u r
focus being the transition from DTP toward a market economy, rather than the
transition from planning to DTP. We develop a household demand model in the
presence of dual tracks, with allowance for endogenous determination of supply,
and we use this model to examine the eﬀects of reducing the role of the plan track;
that is, of we consider the eﬀects of raising the plan-track price and reducing the
plan-track quantity. To incorporate the resale of plan-track quantities into the
model, we assume that there are two diﬀerent types of household: employees of
state-owned enterprises, who beneﬁt from the plan-track subsidy, and the non-
state employees, all of whose purchases are at the market price. Under fairly mild
3assumptions, relaxation of DTP leads to a fall in welfare for the former and a rise
in welfare for the latter.4
We also analyze the eﬀects of the relaxation of DTP on the average price of
a good, i.e., on the weighted sum of the plan-track and the market price. But
although it is the average price that enters the calculation the CPI and inﬂation,
it is the marginal price faced by a household that is primarily what matters for
its behaviour, and so when we interpret inﬂation data, changes in the average
p r i c ew i l lb el e s si m p o r t a n ti ft h e yr e s u l tf r o mc h a n g e si nt h ep l a n - t r a c kp r i c e
and quantity than if they are due to changes in market variables. Indeed, since
the role of the plan track is primarily one of redistribution, the inﬂation resulting
from its reform does not necessarily lead to an increase in the market price. We
show that an increase in the plan-track price has a positive eﬀect on the market
price but a negative eﬀect on the average price, with the strength of these eﬀects
depending on the elasticities of demand and supply of the good concerned. This
implies that government should be aware that a single policy change could result
in signiﬁcantly diﬀerent eﬀects on the prices of diﬀerent goods. We also show that
the eﬀect on demand of a market price change is smaller under DTP, than under
a full market pricing.
4A related welfare discussion is found in Sah and Srinivasan (1988). They deﬁne government
intervention as a lump-sum procurement of DTP goods (agricultural products), which has no
eﬀect on the market price. The eﬀect of government policy on the welfare of rural households is
directly through the implied tax.
4T h ea p p r o a c ht h a tw ed e v e l o pc a nb ea p p l i e dt oa n ys i t u a t i o ni nw h i c ht h e
market is mixed with price regulation. This applies, in particular, to economies
that are still ‘socialist,’ or have not progressed far in the transition from socialism.
For example, Cuba has operated a ‘segmented’ market system for many years that
is similar to DTP, and in time of crisis it has increased the plan-track element
to try and protect the standard of living of the poor (Togores and Garcia, 2004).
The DTP model may also be seen as a natural way of modelling black markets
associated with rationing, and it may be adapted to any situation in which the
market is mixed with price regulation, including reform of the electricity market,
reform of the national health system, and of any market in which free and regulated
prices co-exist.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the basic model with
a homogeneous household is introduced. The weighted average price is deﬁned and
the marginal eﬀects on this average price and on the household’s welfare resulting
from changes in policy variables are derived. In Section 3 the model is extended
to cover two types of household and the possibility of resale of goods is allowed
for. A simple welfare analysis of the winners and losers from reform of DTP is
undertaken. Section 4 concludes, while proofs are given in an appendix.
52 A Representative Household Model
Consider an economy with two representative commodities, X and Y .T h e r e p -
resentative household’s consumption of X and Y are denoted by x and y, respec-
tively. We shall assume that commodity X is subject to DTP, while commodity
Y is the numèraire (this can be viewed as leisure or as a composite commodity).
T h e( r e l a t i v e )m a r k e tp r i c eo fX is denoted by p, while the market price of Y
is unity. The household has an endowment of Y ,w h i c h ,f o rs i m p l i c i t y ,w en o r -




subject to px + y ≤ 1.
Marshallian demand can be expressed as a function of marginal unit price and
full income, m. Here, m is simply the endowment of Y , and so the Marshallian
demand function for X is x(p,1).
With DTP, however, the household can purchase X on the ‘plan track’ up to
the quantity ¯ x at unit price ¯ p. Any quantity above ¯ x has to be purchased on the
‘ m a r k e tt r a c k ’( i . e . ,o nt h ef r e em a r k e t )a tu n i tp r i c ep,w h e r ep>¯ p. Because
we are considering a single representative household in this section, the issue of
6whether it is possible for a household to trade the quantities bought on the plan
track (or, equivalently, the ‘coupons’ entitling purchase on the plan-track) does
not arise. The household’s problem is to solve
max
x,y U(x,y)
subject to ¯ px + y ≤ 1 when x ≤ ¯ x;( 1 )
px + y ≤ 1+( p − ¯ p)¯ x when x>¯ x.
Here, if x ≤ ¯ x, the marginal (and intra-marginal) price facing the household is ¯ p,
while full income is the same as in the absence of DTP. However, if x>¯ x the
marginal price facing the household is the market price p.S i n c e ¯ x intra-marginal
units are obtained at the price ¯ p,f u l li n c o m em u s tb ea d j u s t e dt oa l l o wf o rt h e
implicit subsidy (p−¯ p)¯ x that purchase at this lower price involves (see Dixon 1987;
Bennett and Dixon 1996). Hence, m =1+( p− ¯ p)¯ x, and the Marshallian demand
function becomes
x = x(¯ p,1) when x ≤ ¯ x;
x = x[p,1+( p − ¯ p)¯ x] when x>¯ x. (2)
The arguments of the Marshallian demand function are the parameters of the
7budget constraint, which is depicted in Figure 1. In the absence of DTP the house-
hold begins with an income of one unit of Y and can trade from (0,1) along the line
of slope −p. With DTP the household begins at the same place on the y-axis, but
can trade along the line of slope −¯ p from x =¯ x, i.e., up to point (¯ x,1− ¯ p¯ x),w h i c h
is denoted by A in the ﬁgure. If the household purchases in this range its budget
constraint is fully represented by the intercept y =1and the slope −¯ p.F r o m ¯ x
to B(0, ¯ x +
1−¯ p¯ x
p ) on the horizontal axis, it can only purchase additional units of
X by trading along the line of slope −p. The same points could be reached if,
instead of facing DTP, it faced the price p for all units and had an endowment
of Y equal to 1+( p − ¯ p)¯ x,a ss h o w nb yp o i n tC(0,1+( p − ¯ p)¯ x). Combining the
segments for x ≤ ¯ x and x>¯ x, the entire budget constraint is represented by the
kinked thick line.
Fig 1 about here.
From (2), given that p>¯ p, a change in the free market price p has no eﬀect
on x if x ≤ ¯ x;b u ti fx>¯ x,
dx
dp
= xp +¯ xxm.
We assume throughout that xp < 0 and xm > 0,5 and so the sign of dx/dp is
5A subscript is used to denote the partial derivative with respect to the variable subscripted.
8unclear here. However, denoting the compensated Slutsky term by S,w eh a v e 6
xp = S − xxm. (3)
Eliminating xp, we therefore obtain
dx
dp
= S − (x − ¯ x)xm < 0. (4)
Since S<0,w eh a v et h a tdx/dp < 0. The presence of the DTP quantity ¯ x in (4)
makes the income eﬀect of a market price change smaller, since it only applies to
the market-track portion of consumption. It also implies that the eﬀect on demand
of a market price change is smaller under DTP than under a full market regime.
2.1 The Supply Function
Under DTP, some output is supplied at the plan-track price, but we assume that
total supply will be determined by the marginal price p, i.e., by the market price.
The supply function (in per household terms) is assumed non-decreasing in p;t h a t
6Ad i ﬀerent form of Slutsky equation for DTP is formulated by Liu and Song (2003). Whereas
we specify market price as the parameter that is varied, in their speciﬁcation the plan-track
quantity plays this role. Also, whereas we have the household’s total demand for X as the
endogenous variable, they have the household’s market demand.










p ≥ 0. (5)
For simplicity, we shall assume throughout that the plan-track quantity is no
greater than the proﬁt-maximizing supply at the plan-track price:7
¯ x ≤ x
s (¯ p).
The plan-track price for suppliers is assumed equal to the plan-track price for
consumers. Thus, compared to the market economy, the DTP system operates as
a tax on suppliers, transferring to consumers a portion of proﬁt. If we denote the
proﬁt function corresponding to (5) as π(p), then total proﬁtu n d e rD T Pi s
Π = π(p) − (p − ¯ p)¯ x.
2.2 The CPI
In this section we explore how changes in plan-track parameters aﬀect the weighted
average P of the plan-track and market prices for the representative DTP good
7Given that ¯ x>0, this implies that variable costs are covered at the plan-track price.





x − ¯ x
x
p.( 6 )
Here, since X is representative of the basket of DTP goods, we shall refer to P
interchangeably, as the consumer price index (CPI) or the average price, according
to context. However, when we consider heterogeneous households in Section 3, the
average prices paid will diﬀer across households and so we shall deﬁne the CPI to
be a weighted average of these average prices.
The condition for market clearing is
x[p,1+( p − ¯ p)¯ x]=x
s(p).( 7 )
This is depicted in Figure 2, where U is an indiﬀerence curve and the equilibrium
occurs at E.H e r e , P is represented by (minus) the slope of the line connecting
E with the endowment point on the y-axis. This is the ratio, when consuming x,
of the amount of Y forgone to the quantity x.G i v e n t h a txs > ¯ x,w eh a v et h a t
8Here, we use a linear function for the weighted average price P, but other formulae, such
as Cobb—Douglas, could be used. The important thing is that P should depend on both the
plan-track and the free-market prices.
11p>P>¯ p.9
Fig 2 about here.
To analyze the role of DTP in price liberalization, we consider the eﬀects of an
increase in ¯ p or a decrease in ¯ x (we call each of these reforms ‘transitional policy’)
ﬁrst on the free market price and then on the CPI.
Proposition 1 In a representative household model, transitional policy reduces
the market price, i.e.,
dp
d¯ p < 0 <
dp
d¯ x.
An increase in the plan-track price ¯ p cuts the implicit subsidy (p− ¯ p)¯ x given to
the household, thereby reducing its full income. Consequently, its demand for X
falls, negatively aﬀecting the market price p. The market equilibrium shifts along
the supply curve. If this has a positive slope the quantity supplied is reduced, so
that the overall fall in p is dampened. A decrease in the plan-track quantity ¯ x
reduces the implicit subsidy, with eﬀects that are qualitatively the same as just
described. Thus, the market equilibrium price falls when the government steadily
shifts the DTP system to a competitive market regime.
According to (6), the direct eﬀect on the CPI, P, of an increase in the plan-
track price ¯ p is positive. However, since dp/d¯ p<0, there is also a negative indirect
9In China, a high inﬂation rate was oﬃcially recognized in the late 1980s, when the government
began price liberalisation, starting with an increase of the interest rate. Tight controls were re-
instituted in the austerity programmes of 1986 and 1988, reducing government expenditure and
freezing some long-term capital investments. However, the controls were relaxed later to allow
the growth of the non-state sectors, and regulated prices were raised (Lin 2004). In line with our
analysis, inﬂation of the average price was partly due to an increase of plan-track price.
12eﬀect on the CPI through the induced change in the market price. Let  p denote
price elasticity of demand and  m t h ei n c o m ee l a s t i c i t yo fd e m a n d . O u rn e x t
proposition gives the eﬀorts of reform of DTP on the CPI.
Proposition 2 If X is normal and its supply is non-decreasing in price p,t r a n -
sitional policy inﬂates the CPI, i.e., dP
d¯ p > 0 > dP
dx.
We therefore have a paradoxical situation: when the government raises the
controlled price, the CPI is pushed up but the market equilibrium price is reduced.
The eﬀects of a higher level of ¯ p,w i t h¯ x constant, are illustrated in Figure 3, in
which the supply of X is also ﬁxed (we assume that ¯ p<pthroughout). As in Figure
2, the household is at equilibrium point E initially. When ¯ p is raised the plan-track
segment of the budget line, the downward-sloping line from point B (0,1),r o t a t e s
clockwise about point B. Assuming momentarily that p is unchanged, the budget
line becomes BCD, the sharpness of the kink having been reduced. The household
consumes at point F on CD, which, given that X is normal, is to the left of E. As
there is now an excess supply of X, its market price p falls; i.e., the right-hand
portion of the budget line rotates anti-clockwise around point C. Given that the
quantity of X supplied is unchanged, the rotation occurs until the quantity of X
demanded is at its original level. The new solution is at point G. Recall that the
average price of X in the original situation was minus the slope of BE. Thus, it
13has changed to minus the slope of BG, and therefore the CPI has increased.10
Fig 3 about here.
Our analysis indicates that if the plan-track price of a good is raised, the price
observed in the market will fall, but that the CPI will rise. In a fuller model,
however, the role of commodity Y might be speciﬁed further. Suppose that Y
is leisure time for the urban household and that leisure is normal. A rise in ¯ p
results in a fall in the quantity of leisure consumed; i.e., there is an increase in the
quantity of urban labour supplied. If the supply of manufactures therefore rises,
this will have an oﬀsetting, negative, eﬀect on the price level for the economy as a
whole. A reduction in ¯ x has similar eﬀects.
As an illustration of these eﬀects, consider the ‘ﬁrst-round inﬂation’ that oc-
curred in China in the late 1980s and was regarded as a major set-back to Chinese
economic reform (Bell et al., 1993, and Jaggi et al., 1996). In contrast to the
‘second-round inﬂation’ in 1995, which is generally attributed to over-investment
in urban areas (Gang, 1994) this was primarily caused by changes in government
policy under the dual-track system. To bolster incentives for farmers, from 1979
onwards, the government increased procurement prices and permitted farmers to
10The discussion of the diagram here does not cover what happens if the supply of X changes.
However, as long as the transitional market price falls, the respond of supply has no eﬀect on
our results.
14trade excess output at market prices; but food was still allocated to urban res-
idents at a low price by the plan-track system. This contributed, during the
ﬁrst half of 1980s, to an enormous increase in the government’s budget deﬁcit.11
To alleviate this problem, in 1985 the procurement system was switched from a
mandatory purchase quota system to a voluntary contract procurement system (in
eﬀect reducing ¯ x), with the aim of encouraging farmers to sell more products in
the free market. This switch led to substantial inﬂation of the average food price
P, and consumer price inﬂation rose steadily from 8.8% in 1985 to 17.8% in 1989
(State Statistical Bureau, 2003, p. 313).12
2.3 Welfare
We have seen how a change in the plan-track price aﬀects the market equilibrium
and CPI. The CPI is the price that should be used for calculating the various
price indices in the economy, and hence the rate of inﬂation. However, as argued
in Bennett and Dixon (1995, 1996), if we are interested in household behaviour
the most relevant price is the marginal price, which under DTP is the market price
p. Furthermore, using the indirect utility function, it plays an important role in
11According to Gang (1994) the budget deﬁcit grew by 100%, 99.1% and 284.3% in 1983,
1985 and 1988 respectively. As economic reform in urban areas only began in 1986, this increase
in the government deﬁcit was mainly from the rise in procurement price and investment in rural
areas.
12By 1990, a national trading centre for grains was established and agricultural wholesale
markets were developed throughout the country, symbolically ending the dual track system for
agricultural products in China (Jaggi et al., 1996).
15measuring household welfare.
First, consider of the representative household model. Corresponding to U(x,y),
given that x>x, the indirect utility function for the representative household is
v = v[p,1+( p − ¯ p)¯ x]. (8)
Proposition 3 Transitional policy changes decrease the welfare of the represen-
tative household , i.e., dv
d¯ p < 0 < dv
d¯ x.
Thus, household indirect utility is reduced by the reforms of raising ¯ p and
lowering ¯ x, despite the increase that may occur in the average price. However, this
result would not necessarily arise if we were also to consider the general equilibrium
ramiﬁcations. Reform will increase the proﬁts of the SOEs: the change in proﬁts of
the SOEs is exactly equivalent to the change in the implicit subsidy (p−¯ p)¯ x induced
by the reforms. Since the DTP is in eﬀect a lump-sum transfer from the producer
to the consumer, reform merely serves to redistribute away from the consumer to
the producer. In this case, a household covered by the DTP system would be a
loser from the full liberalization of prices. However, in a capitalist economy the
proﬁts of the ﬁrm ﬁnd their way into the household’s budget constraint and so such
reforms would not reduce welfare. This implies that when resale is not possible,
or is limited, convergence of the plan track price to the higher, market price level
is damaging for households, though state collects more proﬁts from SOEs.
163 Heterogeneous Households
We now drop the assumption that households are homogeneous, for we can then
allow for the possibility of resale. Resale of agricultural products emerged in
the late 1980s, though it has never been oﬃcially recognized. A common sight
then was the man with a bicycle wandering in cities, buying oﬃcial coupons for
food and clothes at a lower price and selling them back to state supply agents at
the government issue price. However, resale has been heavily regulated in some
markets, such as foreign exchange (Jaggi et al., 1996) and there are some products,
such as housing, for which resale has not been not commonly practiced.
For simplicity, we assume that there are no eﬀective legal restrictions or other
frictions on resale. Commodity X therefore exchanges in the resale market at
the market-clearing price p. Rather than allowing a continuum of types, we focus
on a case of particular relevance to the Chinese economy. There are two types
of household in the model, which we index by the superscripts 1 and 2.T h e
proportion α of urban residents is assumed to employed in the state sector (type-1
households), while the proportion 1−α comprises residents employed in the urban
non-state sector (type-2 households).13 At y p e - 1 household is allocated a plan-
13For simplicity, we exclude the ‘ﬂoating population’ of rural workers unoﬃcially inhabiting
urban areas. Although there has been some relaxation of the Chinese household registration
(hukou) system since the late 1990s, it is still very diﬃcult for rural workers without urban
citizenship to ﬁnd a stable job in urban area. So the wage rate diﬀers signiﬁcantly between
ﬂoating urban residents and permanent urban residents. Brooks and Tao (2003) show that the
percentage of permanent urban residents employed in state units, which we represent by α in
this paper, was 67.0, 73.0, 76.4 and 43.9, in 1980, 1990, 1995, and 2000 respectively.
17track ration ¯ x,w h i l eat y p e - 2 household is allocated no ration at all. We also allow
for diﬀerent endowments of Y b e i n gh e l db yt h et w ot y p e s .







1 ≤ ¯ y
1 +( p − ¯ p)¯ x ≡ m
1, (9)
where ¯ y1 is its endowment of Y . Unlike in (1), the budget line is not kinked.
Because resale is possible, household 1 can be thought of as always selling its
entire plan-track allocation to gain the implicit subsidy (p− ¯ p)¯ x, and then buying
the amount it wishes to consume. The implicit subsidy is a component of its full
income m1.







2 ≤ ¯ y
2 ≡ m
2.
Because a type-2 household does not receive a plan-track allocation of X,i t sf u l l
income m2 is simply its endowment ¯ y2.
18The solutions to (9) and (10) yield the Marshallian demand functions
x
1 = x[p, ¯ y
1 +( p − ¯ p)¯ x]
x
2 = x(p, ¯ y
2).
Total demand for X is
x = αx
1 +( 1− α)x
2.







m¯ x = S
1 − (x
1 − ¯ x)x
1






Although dx2/dp < 0, dx1/dp may take either sign. Without the possibility of
resale, as discussed above, the household can only gain the implicit income when
it consumes more than its government subsidy. With resale, the type-1 household
gains an implicit income, even though it consumes less than the government sub-
sidy ¯ x. Eq. (11) shows that when the consumption x1 of DTP goods for a type-1
household is smaller than the plan-track quantity ¯ x, dx1/dp is only negative if the
compensated demand change is numerically greater than the income eﬀect, and
vice versa. However, when the consumption of DTP goods is greater than the
plan-track quantity for a type-1 household, dx1/dp is always negative. In Figure 4
19we demonstrate how an increase in market price can increase the consumption of
X by a type-1 household. As ¯ x and ¯ p are ﬁxed, an increase in market price raises
the implicit income of the type-1 household. This is depicted as the clockwise
rotation around point A of the budget line from BC to LN. The tangency of an
indiﬀerence curve with the new budget line occurs at M, which is the new equi-
librium for the type-1 household. In this case the increase in p causes the type-1
household to consume more (moving from E to M).14
Fig 4 about here.
3.1 Eﬀects on Price Indices
The market-clearance condition is now
αx
1[p, ¯ y
1 +( p − ¯ p)¯ x]+( 1− α)x
2(p, ¯ y
2)=x
s.( 1 2 )
14Figure 4 represents the case in which the household consumption of the DTP good is less
than the plan-track quantity allocation. When, instead, it consumes more than this allocation,
starting at a point on AC, the price change causes it to shift to a point on AN.
































m and xs −α¯ x ≥ 0, then, given that S1 < 0 and S2 < 0, we have ∆ < 0.
Since both types of household face the same market price p, the condition
x1
m ≤ x2
m holds for many common speciﬁcations of preferences. Thus, homothetic
and quasi-homothetic preferences with linear Engel curves have x1
m = x2
m.F u r -
thermore, much of DTP has been of necessities - for example, many foods and
housing. To the households employed in the non-state sector, without the direct
allocation from the plan-track, those goods may be considered more as luxuries
compared to the households with government subsidy, who pay less for those goods
in money terms. Therefore, we view x1
m <x 2
m as a reasonable assumption, reﬂect-
ing a concave Engel curve. α¯ x is the total ration allocated by the central planning
system, which is part of the total supply of X. This gives our next proposition.
21Proposition 4 Assume that x1
m ≤ x2
m and xs −α¯ x ≥ 0. With resale, transitional
policy reduces the market price, i.e.
dp
d¯ p < 0 <
dp
d¯ x.
Thus, we have found that the eﬀect of transitional policy on market equilib-
rium price is negative, with or without the opportunity for resale of the rationed
quantity.
T h en e x tq u e s t i o ni s ,w h a td ow em e a nb yt h eC P In o w ?I ne ﬀect, each type of
household faces a diﬀerent average price, since the mix of market- and plan-track







while the type-2 household faces an average price that is the same as the market
price, p. Since the type-1 household buys the proportion x1
x of the total goods
supply, where x denotes total demand for good X, while the type-2 household
buys the proportion x2

















x is the ratio of goods allocated through the plan-track to the total supply,
which is multiplied by the proportion of the population that is oﬃcially covered
by the plan-track system, to obtain the proportion α ¯ x
x of DTP goods. Given (12),
(16) simpliﬁes to,
P = p − α
¯ x
x1(p − ¯ p). (17)
22When the resale market is available, the two types of household face the CPI
above. Compared to Eq. (6), the CPI is reduced when resale is possible, as α<1.
When the proportion α =1 , and the two models become the same.
Proposition 5 Assuming that x1
m ≤ x2
m and xs−α¯ x ≥ 0, with resale, transitional
policy increases the CPI, i.e., dP
d¯ p > 0 > dP
d¯ x.
We conclude that with or without the possibility of resale, transitional policy
conditionally deﬂates the market price while inﬂating the CPI of DTP goods.
3.2 Winners and Losers
With the two types of household and resale, the indirect utility functions are
v
1 = v[p, ¯ y
1 +( p − ¯ p)¯ x];
v
2 = v(p, ¯ y
2).
Using these functions, we obtain our last proposition.
Proposition 6 When resale is possible, transitional policy reduces the welfare of a
type-1 household, i.e., dv1
d¯ p < 0 < dv1
dx ; but it raises the welfare of a type-2 household,
i.e.,dv2
d¯ p > 0 > dv2
dx .
Irrespective of whether resale is possible, transitional policy reduces the im-
plicit subsidy component of the type-1 household’s full income and therefore re-
23duces its welfare. Without resale, transitional policy has no eﬀect on the welfare
of a type-2 household; but with resale, since transitional policy causes the market
p r i c et og od o w n ,t h ew e l f a r eo fat y p e - 2h o u s e h o l dr i s e s .W h e nt h eD T Ps y s t e m
is being transformed toward a the full market economy, it creates both winners
and losers, in terms of welfare.
This is a striking comparison to Lau et al. (1997, 2000), who consider an
economy in which the existing plan-track obligations must still be fulﬁlled, so that
rents implicit in the plan are maintained, but agents are free to produce and trade
at the margin, thereby creating the opportunity for Pareto gains. In contrast,
in our analysis the value of lump-sum transfers from suppliers to consumers is
endogenously determined, so that the value of rents is not maintained. Thus, the
reform from DTP to a fully market economy is not Pareto improving. Since the
potential loss of rents may generate opposition, this suggests that the latter stage
of reform may involve political problems that are not present in the earlier stage.
4C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we formulate a rigorous microeconomic model of the DTP system for
households. We use this model to analyze ‘transitional policy,’ which we charac-
terize as a reduction in the plan-track quantity and a rise in the plan-track price.
We identify three diﬀerent price indices for DTP goods: the plan-track price, the
24free-market price and the weighted average price (CPI). We consider how the mar-
ket price and the CPI change when plan-track policy variables (price and quantity)
are adjusted during the reform process. A message of the paper is that we need to
be careful in interpreting price or inﬂation data in transition economies because
the measured CPI does not always reﬂect ‘true’ prices.
We show that reform leads to a reduction in the free market price but an
increase in the CPI. An implication is that under a dual-track system inﬂation
can result from transitional policy or from market factors (demand and supply).
In China, when the market track was still relatively small compared to the plan
track, variation in the rate of inﬂation of the CPI was primarily caused by changes
of government policy through plan track prices and quantities; that is, the gov-
ernment still had a considerable inﬂuence over the economy through these ﬁscal
controls. However, as transitional policy shrinks the plan track, the government’s
ability to control over inﬂation diminishes, and insofar as it attempts to do so
through signiﬁcant variation of the plan-track prices and quantities for commodi-
ties still in the dual-track system, considerable distortions in resource allocation
will result.
To allow for the possibility of resale, we consider two diﬀerent types of house-
hold: state employees, who beneﬁt from the plan-track subsidy, and the non-state
employees, all of whose purchases are at the market price. Under relatively mild
25assumptions (e.g. linear Engel curves) transitional policy leads to a fall in the wel-
fare of state employees. Non-state employees, who have been the engine of growth
in China, experience an increase in welfare. Whilst we have developed the partial
equilibrium framework for understanding DTP, an extension would be to embed
it in a simple general equilibrium framework. This would involve modelling ﬁrms
(both SOE and private) and the government.
26Appendix 1: Proofs
Proposition 1
From (7), (xp + xm¯ x)dp − xm¯ xd¯ p + xm(p − ¯ p)d¯ x = xs
pdp. Hence, using (3) to





S − (x − ¯ x)xm − xs
p




−(p − ¯ p)xm







































15We use brackets with superscript 2,(x)2 to deﬁne x square function. The superscript 2
without brackets represents variables for the type-2 household.
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W eh a v es e e ni nt h et e x tt h a ti fx1
m <x 2
m,t h e n∆ < 0. Using this with the
assumption in case 1, that x1 − ¯ x ≤ 0, it is seen here that dv1















Likewise, for a type-2 household, as Proposition 3 holds, that is
dp



















30When x1 − x>0, we have −1 <
αx1
m(x1−¯ x)
∆ < 0, as αx1
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                            Figure 4: The Effect on a Type-1 Household of an Increase in the Market Price 
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